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ARTICLES
WHY AND HOW INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
SHOULD CONDUCT REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS
Jerry Ellig*
Independent regulatory agencies face increasing pressure to con-
duct high-quality economic analysis of regulations, similar to the regula-
tory impact analysis conducted by executive branch agencies. Such
analysis could be required by evolving judicial doctrines, regulatory re-
form statutes, or executive order. This article explains how regulatory
impact analysis can contribute to smarter regulation, documents the cur-
rent low quality of such analysis at many independent regulatory agen-
cies, and offers a blueprint that independent agencies can use to build
their capacity to conduct objective, high-quality analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulations should solve real problems at a reasonable cost.1 To
know whether a proposed regulation is indeed likely to do this, a regula-
tor needs to know whether a real problem exists, whether a proposed
regulation addresses the cause of the problem, and what good things so-
ciety must forgo to enjoy the expected benefits of the regulation. Regula-
tory impact analysis is the tool that provides decision makers with this
information. A complete regulatory impact analysis assesses the nature
and significance of the problem the regulation seeks to solve, identifies
alternative solutions, and estimates the benefits and costs of these
alternatives.2
1 I intentionally avoid the more restrictive normative claim that a regulation’s benefits
should exceed its costs, and I leave the reader to decide what counts as a “problem” and what
amount of cost is “reasonable.” However these are defined, a thorough regulatory impact anal-
ysis provides useful information.
2 These components can all be found in Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Oct. 4, 1993), which outlines the primary requirements for regulatory impact analysis cur-
rently in force for executive branch agencies. For all regulations, agencies are expected to
assess the nature and significance of the problem the regulation seeks to solve. Exec. Order
No. 12866, 58 FR at §§ 1(b)(1), 6(a)(3)(B)(i). An assessment of benefits and costs must ac-
company all “significant” regulations—generally, regulations that have an effect on the econ-
omy exceeding $100 million annually, have other material adverse effects, conflict with other
agencies’ actions, affect federal spending or loan programs materially, or raise novel legal or
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Since 1981, a series of executive orders has required executive
branch agencies to conduct regulatory impact analysis for significant reg-
ulations.3 Independent agencies have not historically been subject to
these executive orders,4 however, they may face growing pressure to
conduct such analysis in the future. That pressure could come from any
of the three branches of government—the courts, Congress, or the
President.
Evolving judicial doctrines now appear to require that regulatory
agencies consider benefits and costs as long as the statute does not pro-
hibit such considerations.5 In Michigan v. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Supreme Court unanimously held that an agency acts unrea-
sonably if it completely ignores economic considerations, unless Con-
gress has directed the agency to do so.6 Because of this case, Richard
Revesz argues that courts will likely require independent agencies that
write financial regulations to conduct benefit-cost analysis.7 Their stat-
utes often contain open-ended authorizations to determine what is “ap-
propriate and necessary” or in the “public interest,” which could be read
to include consideration of costs.8 Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner sug-
gest that courts will ultimately require agencies to conduct formal, quan-
policy issues. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR at § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii). Regulations with economic
effects exceeding $100 million annually or certain other material adverse effects listed in the
executive order must be accompanied by an analysis of the benefits and costs of the regulation
and alternatives, with benefits and costs quantified where feasible. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58
FR at § 6(a)(3)(C).
3 President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 first used the term “regulatory impact anal-
ysis.” See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
4 The Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 1448, 115th Cong. (introduced
2017). See also, The Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, COALITION FOR SENSIBLE
SAFEGUARDS, https://sensiblesafeguards.org/issues/iaraa/.
5 Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review (Harvard Pub. Law,
Working Paper No. 16-12, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=27520
68; Reeve T. Bull & Jerry Ellig, Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact Analysis: Why Not the
Best?, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2017); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Judicial Role (U. Chicago Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 614, 32–35 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2915063.
6 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (“One would not say
that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic
costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”); see also id. at 2716–17
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—
factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise, an agency acts unreasonably in es-
tablishing ‘a standard-setting process that ignore[s] economic considerations.’” (internal cita-
tion omitted)); MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 15-0045 (D.D.C. Mar. 30,
2016), slip op. at 30 (“In the end, cost must be balanced against benefit because ‘[n]o regula-
tion is “appropriate” if it does significantly more harm than good.’” (internal citation
omitted)).
7 Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative
State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 548 (2017).
8 Id.
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titative benefit-cost analyses to determine whether a regulation causes
more good than harm.9
On the congressional front, the idea that independent regulatory
agencies should conduct regulatory impact analysis to inform decisions
has long been part of the discussion about regulatory reform legisla-
tion.10 Major regulatory reform bills in both the Senate and the House
would require virtually all regulatory agencies, including the independent
ones, to consider the nature and significance of the problem they seek to
solve, alternative solutions, and the benefits and costs of alternatives.11
Agencies would also be required to rely on the best available scientific,
technical, and economic information—a provision that would effectively
require reasonably thorough regulatory impact analysis.12
To date, no president has attempted to compel independent agencies
to conduct regulatory impact analysis. Key figures in both Republican
and Democratic administrations—such as C. Boyden Gray, coauthor of
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291, and Sally Katzen, a principal
author of President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866—contend that a
president has the legal authority to do so, but administrations have sought
9 Masur & Posner, supra note 5, at 34–35.
10 Numerous experts have recommended such analyses. See Letter from Susan Dudley,
Dir., Geo. Wash. Reg. Stud. Ctr. et al. to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Sept. 13, 2012), available
at https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=563c60e4-3770-
4329-b1aa-ff51752cd750; American Bar Association House of Delegates, Recommendation:
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 1990 ANNUAL MEETING, https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1990_am_302.authcheckdam.pdf; Robert Hahn & Cass
Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1531–37 (2002); Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty:
Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 103, 109–10 (2011);
The APA at 65—Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth and Reduce
Costs?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Courts, Commercial & Administrative Law,
112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Peter L. Strauss, 47–48), available at http://judiciary.house
.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Strauss02282011.pdf; Regulatory Accountablity Act of 2011: Hearing
on H.R. 3010 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 44–49 (2011) (statement of
C. Boyden Gray, coauthor of Executive Order 12291), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
_files/hearings/pdf/Gray%2010252011.pdf; The APA at 65—Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs,
Promote Economic Growth and Reduce Costs?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial & Admin. Law, 112th Cong. 20 (2011) (statement of Susan Dudley, Dir., Geo.
Wash. Reg. Stud. Ctr.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Dudley0228
2011.pdf. President Obama’s Jobs Council recommended that independent agencies be re-
quired to conduct regulatory impact analysis, coupled with review by OIRA or some other
independent entity. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVENESS, ROAD MAP TO
RENEWAL 45 (2011), available at http://files.jobs-council.com/files/2012/01/JobsCouncil_
2011YearEndReportWeb.pdf.
11 Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017) § 3(b); Regulatory
Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017) § 103(b).
12 Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017) §§ 3(c)(3) and
3(f)(3); Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017) § 103(f)(2).
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to avoid a confrontation with Congress over the issue.13 In December
2017, sixteen state attorneys general and governors signed a letter asking
President Trump to issue a new executive order extending regulatory im-
pact analysis requirements to independent agencies.14 Thus, an executive
order requiring independent agencies to conduct regulatory impact analy-
sis remains a definite possibility.
Independent agencies may therefore be required to conduct regula-
tory impact analysis, but few have developed the capacity to do so.
Assessments by agency inspectors general, the US Government Account-
ability Office (GAO), and independent scholars find that many indepen-
dent agencies’ regulatory analyses lack basic information such as
monetized estimates of benefits, monetized estimates of costs (other than
paperwork costs), or discussion of benefits and costs of alternatives to
the regulation.15
Some agencies have recognized that producing quality analysis re-
quires significant changes in organizational structure, practices, and cul-
ture. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lost
several high-profile court cases because of insufficient economic analysis
after courts interpreted language in the SEC’s authorizing statute to re-
quire benefit-cost analysis of regulations.16 In response, the SEC
launched an initiative in 2012 to improve the quality of economic analy-
sis and the influence of economists in regulatory decisions.17 The chief
economist became a direct report to the chairman, the general counsel
and chief economist issued joint guidance on economic analysis based on
the principles executive branch agencies must follow, and the Commis-
13 C. Boyden Gray, The President’s Constitutional Power to Order Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Centralized Review of Independent Agency Rulemaking (May 31, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Mercatus Center at George Mason University), https://www.mercatus
.org/system/files/mercatus-gray-executive-power-independent-agencies-v1.pdf; Katzen, supra
note 10, at 109–10. But see Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analysis and Independent Regula- R
tory Agencies 20–25 (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Copeland%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf.
14 Letter from Ken Paxton, Tx. Att’y Gen. et al. to President Donald Trump (Dec. 20,
2017), available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/epress/Independent_Agency_
Letter_FINAL.pdf?cachebuster:81.
15 See Part III infra.
16 The SEC must consider the effects of proposed regulations on competition, efficiency,
and capital formation when determining whether the regulation is in the public interest. This
language appears in Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Section 3(f)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f); and Section 2(c) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–2(c). This requirement was added to these statutes
by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 added the language to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b–2(c).
17 See Memorandum from the SEC Division of Risk, Strategy, and Fin. Innovation and
the Off. of Gen. Couns. to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices (Mar. 16, 2012)
(on file with author).
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sion more than doubled the number of PhD financial economists on
staff.18 The quality of SEC economic analysis has improved measurably
since then.19 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides
another example. In April 2017, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai announced plans
to expand the role of economic analysis at the FCC by moving most of
its economists into a new Office of Economics and following Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on regulatory impact analysis
when issuing new regulations; the FCC approved the creation of this of-
fice in January 2018.20
An agency seeking to improve its economic analysis of regulations
faces significant challenges in constructing the capacity to do so and en-
suring that economists and other analysts have the appropriate incentives
and opportunity to conduct objective analysis. This Article addresses
those challenges. Part II clarifies the role that regulatory impact analysis
can play in promoting smart regulation. Part III documents the low qual-
ity of such analysis at many independent agencies and presents some
brief examples that demonstrate how low-quality analysis can lead to
poor decisions. Part IV explains key implementation steps an indepen-
dent agency can take to improve its analysis and ensure that the analysis
is considered when making regulatory decisions. The Article concludes
with some suggestions on how an agency can make a credible commit-
ment to produce and use high-quality regulatory impact analysis in the
future.
I. THE PURPOSE OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
BETTER REGULATION
Citizens expect federal regulation to accomplish many important
things such as protecting them from financial fraudsters, preventing
workplace injuries, preserving clean air, and deterring terrorist attacks.
However, regulation also requires sacrifice and there is no free lunch.
Depending on the regulation, consumers may pay more, workers may
receive less, our retirement savings may grow more slowly because of
reduced corporate profits, and we may have less privacy or less personal
18 See id.; Revesz, supra note 7.
19 Jerry Ellig, Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis since Business Roundtable: A
Structured Assessment (Dec. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Mercatus
Center at George Mason University), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/improvements-
SEC-economic-analysis.
20 See Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks on Economic Analysis at the
Hudson Institute (Apr. 5, 2017), available at https://hudson.org/events/1415-commission-
chairman-ajit-pai-on-economic-analysis-at-the-fcc42017; Federal Communications Commis-
sion, In the Matter of Establishment of the Office of Economics and Analytics, Order (Jan. 30,
2018), available at https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0131/
FCC-18-7A1.pdf.
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freedom. Given the important values at stake, regulatory agencies should
craft regulations with knowledge of their likely results. A decision
maker’s failure or refusal to acquire this knowledge before making a de-
cision is a willful choice to act based on ignorance.
Reasonable people disagree about the tradeoffs they are willing to
make to get the benefits that regulation provides.21 However, reasonable
people surely can agree that regulators should not adopt a regulation un-
less they are reasonably certain that it will solve a real problem at a
reasonable cost.
Regulatory impact analysis is the tool that helps agencies identify
whether alternative regulatory proposals are likely to solve a real prob-
lem and at what cost.22 The principal elements of regulatory analysis
outlined in executive orders and in OMB guidance reflect standard eco-
nomic principles of policy analysis and government performance man-
agement.23 To provide four types of critical information, regulatory
impact analysis should:
1) Assess the nature and significance of the problem the
agency is trying to solve, so the agency knows
whether there is a problem that could be solved
through regulation, and so the agency can tailor a so-
lution that will effectively solve the problem;24
2) Identify a wide variety of alternative solutions;25
3) Define the benefits the agency seeks to achieve in ul-
timate outcomes that affect citizens’ quality of life,
21 See John Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 432–38 (2008) (discussing the different ways decision makers might use the
results of regulator impact analysis).
22 See id. at 514.
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-714, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGEN-
CIES INCLUDED KEY ELEMENTS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, BUT EXPLANATIONS OF REGULA-
TIONS’ SIGNIFICANCE COULD BE MORE TRANSPARENT 3 (2014) (“These four broad elements
stem from several sources including Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, OMB’s Circular A-4,
and general economic principles. Circular A-4, consistent with standard economic principles,
identifies these selected elements as basic elements to include in the regulatory analysis re-
quired by the executive orders.”); Jerry Ellig & Jerry Brito, Toward a More Perfect Union:
Regulatory Analysis and Performance Management, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1 (2009) (ex-
plaining parallels between analytical steps for regulatory impact analysis and government per-
formance management); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 112 (1991) (defining regulatory anal-
ysis as the application of rational policy analysis to regulation).
24 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR at §§ 1(b)(1), 6(a)(3)(B)(i).
25 Id. at § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii). See also U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3–5 (2003), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4/.
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and assess each alternative’s ability to achieve those
outcomes;26
4) Identify the good things that regulated entities, con-
sumers, and other stakeholders must sacrifice to
achieve the desired outcomes under each alterna-
tive.27 In economics jargon, these sacrifices are
known as “costs,” but like benefits, costs may in-
volve far more than monetary expenditures.28
If this information is not produced, agencies are more likely to base regu-
latory decisions on hopes, intentions, and wishful thinking than on
reality.
The executive branch has had almost four decades of experience
with regulatory impact analysis.29 Numerous studies document instances
in which regulatory analysis helped improve regulatory decisions by pro-
viding additional options regulators could consider or by unearthing new
information about benefits or costs of particular modifications to the reg-
ulation.30 For example, Scott Farrow, who studied a 2004 Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulation requiring power plants to design
cooling water intake structures that minimize harm to marine organisms,
concluded that the “EPA clearly chose an approach that imposed a sig-
nificantly lighter burden on society . . . . The record provides substantial
evidence that the agency considered a lower-cost alternative to meeting a
standard with the potential to save approximately $3 billion in annualized
dollars or approximately $40 billion in present value.”31
The primary documented effect of regulatory impact analysis ap-
pears to be on the margins of regulations, identifying opportunities to
increase benefits or achieve the same outcomes at lower cost.32 At the
conclusion of a generally pessimistic assessment of the impact of eco-
nomic analysis, Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock acknowledge that when
regulations create billions of dollars’ worth of benefit or costs, even mar-
26 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR at §§ 6(a)(3)(C)(i), 6(a)(3)(C)(iii). See also U.S. OF-
FICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25, at 7–9.
27 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR at §§ 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 6(a)(3)(C)(iii). See also U.S. OF-
FICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25, at 18–42.
28 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR at §§ 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 6(a)(3)(C)(iii). See also U.S. OF-
FICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25, at 18–42.
29 See Exec. Order.No. 12291, supra note 3. R
30 REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009);
RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN, ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT
(1997); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).
31 Scott Farrow, Improving the CWIS Rule Regulatory Analysis: What Does an Econo-
mist Want?, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 176, 182. R
32 See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory
Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 82 (2008).
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ginal changes can be significant for society.33 They also note that the
most important contribution of regulatory impact analysis may be its de-
terrent value in preventing regulators from advancing economically un-
sound proposals.34
Although it has led to improvements in regulation, regulatory im-
pact analysis is no panacea. GAO studies and scholarly research reveal
that in many cases, regulatory impact analyses are not sufficiently com-
plete to serve as a guide to agency decisions.35 The quality of analysis
varies widely, and even the most elaborate analyses still have
problems.36 The Mercatus Center at George Mason University’s Regula-
tory Report Card, which evaluates the quality of regulatory impact analy-
sis for the 130 economically significant, prescriptive regulations
proposed between 2008 and 2013, finds that agencies’ actual practice
often falls far short of the principles enunciated in Executive Order
12866 and OMB guidance.37 Regulatory impact analyses sometimes
seem to be advocacy documents written to justify decisions that were
already made, rather than information that helped regulators determine
what to do.38
33 Id. at 82–83.
34 Id. at 79.
35 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD IM-
PROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC ANALYSES
(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-98-142; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: INFORMATION CONTAINED IN EPA’S REGULATORY IMPACT ANAL-
YSES CAN BE MADE CLEARER (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-97-38.
A more recent study found that most regulatory impact analyses cover the four major elements
identified earlier, but the study cautions that it did not evaluate the quality of the analysis. See
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 4. R
36 See Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, The Challenges of Improving the Economic Analysis
of Pending Regulations: The Experience of OMB Circular A-4 (Dec. 2010) (Resources for the
Future, Discussion Paper 10-54) (on file with author); Jamie Belcore & Jerry Ellig, Homeland
Security and Regulatory Analysis: Are We Safe Yet?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2008); Robert W.
Hahn, et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with
Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); Robert W. Hahn & Patrick
M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits
and Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and Europe, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 473 (2005); Robert W. Hahn
et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality?, AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies
(2000).
37 Jerry Ellig, Evaluating the Quality and Use of Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Mer-
catus Center’s Regulatory Report Card, 2008–2013 (Jul. 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Mercatus Center at George Mason University), available at https://www.mercatus
.org/publication/evaluating-regulatory-impact-analysis-regulatory-report-card.
38 Richard Williams, The Influence of Regulatory Economists in Federal Health and
Safety Agencies (Jul. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Mercatus Center at George
Mason University), mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/WP0815_Regulatory%20Econ
omists.pdf; Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy Analysis, in
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 57. R
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Despite these shortcomings, regulatory impact analysis can generate
significant improvements when agencies perform a thorough analysis
and consider the results carefully when making decisions. Unfortunately,
most independent agencies lag far behind executive branch agencies in
the quality and use of regulatory impact analysis, as Part III documents.
II. THE NEED FOR THOROUGH REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
AT INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
We do not know whether many of the regulations adopted by inde-
pendent agencies solve real problems at a reasonable cost, because inde-
pendent agencies often neglect to conduct thorough regulatory impact
analysis of alternatives when developing new regulations.
A. Regulatory Ferment
For the past two decades, regulation by independent agencies has
risen steadily.39 Figure 1 shows the increase in total number of regulatory
restrictions from independent agencies since 1970.40
A “regulatory restriction” is a binding requirement in a regulation that
contains the words “shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” or “re-
quired.”41 Independent agencies accounted for 140,915 regulatory re-
strictions in 2017—about 13 percent of the US government’s total.42
Among independent agencies, the FCC had the largest number of restric-
tions (28,529), followed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(16,603) and the SEC (15,124). The consequences of regulatory accumu-
lation are significant; a recent study estimated that the additional federal
regulatory restrictions adopted between 1980 and 2012 could have
slowed GDP growth by as much as 0.8 percent annually.43
B. Poor Impact Analysis
Unfortunately, some of the ingredients in this ever-expanding pie of
regulations leave a lot to be desired. A study prepared for the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States assesses economic analyses of
39 Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, QuantGov—A Policy Analytics Platform
(2017), http://docs.QuantGov.org/QuantGov_working_paper.pdf (last visited March 6, 2018).
40 Id.
41 Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical Database on In-
dustry-Specific Regulations for All United States Industries and Federal Regulations,
1997–2012, 11 REG. & GOV. 109, 112 (2017).
42 Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData: A QuantGov Product,
QUANTGOV (2017).
43 Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regulations (April 26, 2016) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with Mercatus Center at George Mason University), available at
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/cumulative-cost-regulations.
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regulations by independent regulatory agencies.44 It covers evaluations
by the GAO, agency inspectors general, and outside researchers.45 The
author also performs some of his own evaluations of agency economic
analysis.46 Key findings of this report include the following:
• Independent agencies often perform some type
of analysis that considers benefits and costs
qualitatively.47
• Some agencies fail to analyze benefits or costs of
parts of the regulation that are required by law. As a
result, their analysis does not provide a complete as-
sessment of the benefits and costs of the entire
regulation.48
• Quantification of benefits is uncommon.49
• Quantification of costs is more common, but it is
often confined to paperwork costs.50
• Costs to agencies are often ignored.51
• Benefits and costs of alternatives are less likely to be
considered or quantified.52
These findings are consistent with those in other studies by indepen-
dent scholars. Art Fraas and Randall Lutter, for example, examine the
analysis accompanying seventy-eight major regulations issued by inde-
pendent agencies between 2003 and 2010.53 Benefits and costs were dis-
cussed in the analysis for 69 percent of the regulations.54 However, only
12 percent of the regulations were accompanied by monetized estimates
of benefits, and only 47 percent had monetized estimates of costs.55 The
cost estimates frequently included only the paperwork costs.56 In con-
trast, executive branch agencies almost always included a discussion of
benefits and costs with their regulations.57 Some quantitative estimates of
benefits were provided for about 60 percent of executive branch regula-
tions, and quantitative estimates of costs were provided for more than 75
44 See generally Copeland, supra note 13, at 61–110. R
45 Id. at 61.
46 Id. at 110–23.
47 Id. at 75, 78–80, 81, 87.
48 Id. at 74–78, 94.
49 Id. at 80–81, 87.
50 Id. at 80–81, 88.
51 Id. at 76, 78, 80–81, 88.
52 Id. at 75, 80.
53 Arthur Fraas & Randall L. Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Inde-
pendent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. LAW REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 213 (2011).
54 Id. at 237–40.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 217.
57 Id. at 215.
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percent.58 Even some independent financial regulatory agencies that are
required by law to consider benefits and costs do not prepare very thor-
ough benefit-cost analyses.59 A study of SEC regulations issued before
the 2012 economic analysis guidance found that the SEC’s assessments
of the problem, baseline, alternatives, benefits, and costs were far less
complete than those conducted by executive branch agencies.60
A related but distinct problem is “ready-fire-aim” rulemaking, in
which the regulatory agency makes key decisions first and then expects
analysts to produce a document that supports those decisions.61 For ex-
ample, before SEC benefit-cost analysis became subject to judicial re-
view, SEC releases typically included a benefit-cost analysis section that
merely repeated arguments in favor of the regulation that had already
been made elsewhere in the document.62 A former SEC attorney noted,
“Historically, the agency’s lawyers have been primarily responsible for
drafting these analyses with varying degrees of assistance from the
agency’s economists.”63 Even when economists are responsible for the
economic analysis, they are less likely to conduct high-quality analysis
(particularly of alternatives) if they know that the major decisions have
already been made.64
C. Regulation Without Analysis: Cautionary Tales
Consider a few examples of independent agency regulatory propos-
als or decisions made in the absence of some of the information that a
thorough regulatory impact analysis would have provided.
1. Problem Analysis: Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors
Companies that issue securities can avoid costly SEC registration
requirements if they restrict the sale of those securities to “accredited
investors,” who are believed to have sufficient sophistication and finan-
cial wherewithal that they do not need the protections provided by SEC
registration.65 One way an investor meets the accredited investor test is
58 Id. at 237. Percentages for independent agencies were calculated from data in table 1.
59 Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators, 9 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 569 (2013). See also Revesz, supra note 7.
60 Jerry Ellig & Hester Peirce, SEC Regulatory Analysis: “A Long Way to Go and a
Short Time to Get There,” 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 361 (2014).
61 Williams, supra note 38, at 5; Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as
Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 56, 57. R
62 Bruce Kraus and Conor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
YALE J. REG. 289, 297–98 (2013).
63 Peirce, supra note 59, at 582. The author later notes that the SEC substantially R
changed its approach starting in 2012. Id. at 585.
64 See Williams, supra note 38, at 5.
65 Ellig & Peirce, supra note 60, at 408.
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by demonstrating that he or she has a net worth of $1 million or more.66
In 2011, the SEC adopted a regulation that excludes the value of an in-
vestor’s primary residence when determining whether the individual
meets the $1 million net worth requirement.67 The change was required
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.68
The Act also gave the SEC authority to conduct an analysis of the statu-
tory definition of “accredited investor” and modify it as the SEC “may
deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the public interest,
and in light of the economy.”69 The SEC explicitly declined to exercise
this authority to adjust the definition.70
If the SEC had considered modifying the definition, it could have
evaluated whether the regulation solves a real problem. The SEC could
have examined whether individuals whose home values had recently put
them above the $1 million threshold actually invested in unregistered
securities and suffered any harm from doing so. Perhaps this was a sig-
nificant problem, or perhaps these individuals made minimal investments
in unregistered securities, or perhaps issuers of unregistered securities
declined to market them to these potential investors.71 The answers to
these questions could have affected whether or how the SEC opted to
change the definition, but the SEC declined to consider this issue.
If there is a significant investor protection problem, the adequacy of
the net worth requirement to solve the problem is not obvious. The SEC
could have considered whether a net worth test would sufficiently protect
investors from making bad investment decisions or whether a financial
sophistication test or diversification requirement could achieve that ob-
jective more effectively. Existing regulations already require broker-
dealers to make only “suitable” investment recommendations to their
customers. The suitability requirement, perhaps with a heightened level
of care when the bulk of the investor’s net worth consists of home equity,
may have been sufficient to address the problem.72 The SEC conducted
no such analyses, so it is not clear if the regulation solves an actual prob-
lem or does so in the most effective way.
Such deficiencies in SEC analysis may become less common as a
result of court decisions that remanded several important regulations be-
66 Id. at 409.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 410.
70 Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9287,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3341, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239, 270, 275 (2012).
71 Ellig & Peirce, supra note 60, at 410–11.
72 Id.
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cause of insufficient economic analysis.73 Unlike most independent
agencies, the SEC’s authorizing statute contains language that courts
have interpreted to require benefit-cost analysis.74 In 2012, the SEC’s
general counsel and chief economist issued new staff guidance on eco-
nomic analysis that explicitly draws on OMB’s regulatory analysis gui-
dance for executive branch agencies.75 The Commission’s economic
analysis of regulations, including analysis of the underlying problem, has
improved measurably since then.76
2. Alternatives: Surface Transportation Board’s Competitive
Switching Proposal for Freight Railroads
The Surface Transportation Board (STB) inherited the residual eco-
nomic regulatory responsibilities of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion when the latter was abolished in 1996.77 In July 2016, the STB
proposed new regulations defining when a shipper can require a railroad
serving its facilities to switch cars carrying the shipper’s freight to a
competing railroad.78 Under current policy, regulators require competi-
tive switching only if the shipper can show that switching is necessary to
prevent or remedy some anticompetitive abuse committed by the railroad
serving its facilities.79
Instead of demonstrating with evidence that anticompetitive abuse is
widespread, the STB proposal simply claimed that proving anticompeti-
tive abuse is too difficult.80 The sole evidence cited in support of this
claim is that very few competitive switching cases have been brought
before regulators since the current policy was adopted in 1985, and ship-
pers have never won a case.81 But these facts are not sufficient proof. An
absence of anticompetitive abuse cases could indicate either that the cur-
73 Paul Rose and Christopher J. Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Fi-
nancial Regulation (Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness Report 27, 2013), available at
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/CBA-Report-3.10.13
.pdf.
74 Id. But see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, No. 13-cv-635 (RLW),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102616, at *35–36 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2013) (explaining that reading the
requirement to consider competition, capital formation, and efficiency to require “that the SEC
conduct some sort of broader, wide-ranging benefit analysis simply reads too much into this
statutory language.”).
75 SEC Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation and the Office of General
Counsel, supra note 17.
76 Ellig, supra note 19.
77 Resources: ICC Information, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, https://www.stb
.gov/stb/public/resources_icc.html.
78 Surface Transportation Board, Petition for Rulemaking to Adopt Revised Competitive
Switching Rules; Reciprocal Switching, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,
149–51, 165 (Aug. 3, 2016).
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
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rent STB procedures are too cumbersome or that little anticompetitive
abuse is occurring. A thorough regulatory impact analysis would have
systematically examined evidence of anticompetitive abuse to determine
whether a major problem exists, and if so, what caused the problem.
Armed with an evidence-based explanation of the problem’s cause, the
STB could then assess the likely results of alternative solutions.
The STB’s competitive switching proposal was accompanied by lit-
tle or no analysis of alternative solutions that might be more effective or
less burdensome. If current policy is so vague and cumbersome that it
allows significant anticompetitive abuse to occur, then an obvious solu-
tion would be for the STB to provide clear guidance on the types of
evidence a shipper must present to demonstrate anticompetitive abuse in
its particular situation. Another solution was proposed in 2015 by a
Transportation Research Board committee on which I served. We sug-
gested that the STB should develop a screening model that uses rate data
to identify whether a shipper appears to be paying unusually high rates,
and then allow a shipper found to be paying unusually high rates to take
its case to an arbitrator. The shipper could ask for competitive switching
as a remedy.82 A thorough regulatory impact analysis would have evalu-
ated the pros and cons of these reasonable alternatives.
3. Benefits: High-Powered Magnets as Desktop Toys
A 2016 court decision remanding the Consumer Product Safety
Commission’s (CPSC’s) safety standard for magnet sets illustrates some
significant flaws in the CPSC’s analysis of prospective benefits.83
Around 2009, several companies began marketing sets of small, high-
powered rare earth magnets as desktop toys and stress relievers for
adults.84 In response to reports of injuries to children who ingested mag-
nets, the CPSC in 2011 sent notices of noncompliance to companies that
appeared to be marketing or labeling these magnets to appeal to children
younger than age 14, and it warned other companies that they should not
market or label the magnets to appeal to this age group.85 In 2012, the
CPSC negotiated agreements with 10 of the 13 distributors to cease im-
portation.86 In 2014, the CPSC adopted a final rule requiring all magnet
sets to meet the strength and size standards that previously applied only
82 COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF FREIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTATION AND REGULATION,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, MODERNIZING FREIGHT RAIL REGULATION 210–14
(2015).
83 Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 851 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir.
2016).
84 Id. at 1144.
85 Id. at 1145.
86 Id. at 1146.
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to magnet sets marketed as children’s toys.87 Essentially, this rule meant
that the high-powered magnet sets could no longer be sold, even to
adults.88 The one remaining importer, which required its retailers to re-
strict sales of the magnets to customers 18 years of age or older, sued the
CPSC.89
The court found two problems that inflated the CPSC’s estimate of
prospective benefits. First, to estimate the number of injuries the standard
would prevent, the analysis used data on emergency room visits linked to
magnet sets from January 2009 through June 2012.90 This created an
artificially high baseline number of injuries because it ignored the fact
that injuries dropped substantially after 2012 as a result of the commis-
sion’s enforcement actions in 2011 and 2012.91 Second, it is not clear
whether the injury data employed by the commission accurately reflected
the number of injuries caused by magnets.92 Ninety percent of the injury
reports only “possibly” involved ingestion of magnets.93 In the absence
of any further assessment, the actual number of injuries attributable to
magnets could vary by a factor of 10.94
In this case, the errors were caught because the CPSC is required to
conduct benefit-cost analysis for product safety standards, and courts can
review that analysis as part of the record.95 As CPSC Commissioner Jo-
seph Mohorovic noted, “Although having a rule thrown out is not pleas-
ant for the agency, if we take to heart this reminder of the importance of
the . . . analysis, our future rules will be better and sounder for the
effort.”96
The CPSC could have prevented these mistakes, and perhaps could
have avoided or won the lawsuit, if it had simply followed OMB gui-
dance for preparing regulatory impact analysis. Additionally, if CPSC
regulations were subject to review by the Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs (OIRA), these clear violations of OMB guidance likely
would have been caught during OIRA’s review.
OMB Circular A-4 clearly states that when identifying the baseline,
analysts should take into account evolution of the marketplace, changes
87 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Final Rule: Safety Standard for Magnet Sets,
79 Fed. Reg. 59, 962–59, 989 (Oct. 3, 2014).
88 See Zen Magnets at 1146.
89 Id. at 1146–47.
90 Id. at 1149.
91 See id. at 1149–50.
92 Id. at 1150.
93 Id. at 1151.
94 See id. at 1151–52.
95 See id. at 1147.
96 Joseph P. Mohorovic, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, THE
REGULATORY REVIEW (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/01/10/mohorobic-
improving-regulatory-analysis-independent-agencies/.
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in regulations, and the degree of compliance by regulated entities with
other regulations97—precisely the factors the CPSC neglected. For ex-
ample, the CPSC explicitly declared that changes in the marketplace in-
duced by its enforcement activity before the new rule should not be
included in the baseline.98
OMB’s instructions on treatment of uncertainty are likewise quite
specific and describe precisely what the CPSC failed to do in this case:
When benefit and cost estimates are uncertain . . . you
should report benefit and cost estimates (including bene-
fits of risk reductions) that reflect the full probability
distribution of potential consequences. Where possible,
present probability distributions of benefits and costs
and include the upper and lower bound estimates as
complements to central tendency and other estimates.
If fundamental scientific disagreement or lack of
knowledge prevents construction of a scientifically de-
fensible probability distribution, you should describe
benefits or costs under plausible scenarios and character-
ize the evidence and assumptions underlying each alter-
native scenario.99
The CPSC estimated that the new magnet standard would create
$28.6 million in benefits annually by preventing injuries, at a cost of at
least $6 million annually.100 The cost figure includes only lost profits to
producers, not lost value to consumers. But if the benefits were over-
stated up to tenfold, the costs easily could have outweighed the benefits.
Clearly a more careful analysis of the benefits would have been helpful.
4. Costs: Federal Communications Commission’s Digital
Television Receiver Mandate
In 2002, as part of the transition from analog to digital television
broadcasts, the FCC phased in a requirement that new television sets
must have the capability to receive broadcast digital TV signals.101 The
FCC cited some cost figures submitted by various interested parties, but
97 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25, at 15. R
98 “Because CPSC compliance actions have significantly altered the state of the market,
the environment before these actions occurred represents the best approximation of how the
market would have operated in the absence of CPSC intervention and is the appropriate refer-
ence baseline for evaluating the impact of the rule.” Consumer Product Safety Commission,
supra note 87, at 59, 978.
99 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25, at 18.
100 Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra note 87, at 59, 979–82.
101 Federal Communications Commission, Review of the Commission’s Rules and Poli-
cies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Second Report and Order 2 (Aug. 9,
2002).
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it did not perform its own independent cost analysis.102 A consultant’s
study submitted by broadcasters estimated that a digital tuner would in-
crease the cost of a TV set by $16 in 2006.103 The Consumer Electronics
Association claimed that a tuner would cost $200.104 The FCC appeared
to place most credibility in estimates from two individual manufacturers
that ranged between $50 and $75.105
Without further analysis or elaboration, the Commission asserted
simply that “the potential price increases under our phase-in plan are
within an acceptable range.”106 There was no analysis of benefits or
other results attributable to this mandate that could be compared with
costs to determine whether the costs were acceptable. This omission was
especially glaring because, as one Commissioner pointed out, about 85
percent of consumers at the time received television signals from cable
or satellite companies.107 These consumers were not receiving over-the-
air broadcast signals, but the regulation required them to pay for an over-
the-air digital tuner they did not need.108 The D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the FCC acted within its authority when it made this
decision, because “such a shifting of the benefits and burdens of a regu-
lation is well within the authority of the responsible agency.”109 But just
because the FCC had the legal authority to make this decision does not
mean that the decision was either a fair one or the lowest-cost way to
achieve the regulatory objective of ensuring that broadcast households
could continue to receive TV signals when analog broadcasts would be
phased out.
A thorough cost analysis would have included the following
features:
• A projected baseline future trend for purchase of TV
sets with digital tuners by consumers who actually
needed them—the consumers who received only
broadcast TV.
102 See id. at 6–7, 10, 24.
103 Id. at 7.
104 Id. at 8.
105 Id. at 20–21.
106 Id. at 21.
107 Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Separate Statement, Review of the Commis-
sion’s Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Second Report and
Order, Fed. Commc’n. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/
review-commissions-rules-and-policies-affecting-conversion-digital-television-0.
108 Commissioner Kevin J. Martin, Dissenting Statement, Review of the Commission’s
Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Second Report and Order,
Fed. Commc’n. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/re
view-commissions-rules-and-policies-affecting-conversion-digital-television-0.
109 Consumer Electronics Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 301 (2003).
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• An assessment of how various types of mandates
would have affected the per-unit and total costs of
producing digital tuners, as well as the rate of
adoption.
• A distributional analysis showing how much of the
cost would be paid by cable and satellite households
who did not need digital broadcast converters.
• A comparison of the cost of mandating digital tuners
to the costs of alternatives, such as the subsidies for
set-top converters that Congress ultimately adopted
in 2005.110 If there had been no FCC mandate for
digital tuners in new TVs, the additional cost of pro-
viding subsidized set-top boxes to consumers who
bought TVs without digital tuners during the transi-
tion period could have been far lower than the cost of
mandating digital tuners in all new TVs.111 The FCC
undertook no rigorous comparison of alternatives that
would have answered this question before it imposed
the mandate.
III. KEY STEPS FOR BETTER REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Five key steps are necessary to ensure that an agency conducts
sound regulatory impact analysis and considers it carefully when making
regulatory decisions. Some of these steps are best practices that already
have been implemented at some independent agencies. Others are based
on lessons drawn from the experience of executive branch agencies that
have been conducting this type of analysis for more than three decades.
First, the agency needs to organize and manage economists in a way
that promotes high-quality, objective analysis. Second, the agency should
establish standards for regulatory impact analysis. Third, the analysis
should be conducted before regulatory decisions are made. Fourth, the
agency should clearly explain how the analysis affected regulatory deci-
sions. Fifth, the agency should invite OIRA to review its regulations and
the accompanying analysis, just as OIRA does for executive branch
regulations.
110 Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Adminis-
tration, Rules to Implement and Administer a Coupon Program for Digital-to-Analog Con-
verter Boxes, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,097–12,121 (March 15, 2007).
111 As a participant in the subsidy program, the author received two $40 coupons that
allowed him to acquire two simple set-top boxes for a pair of old analog TVs at no additional
cost.
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A. Organize and Manage Economists to Promote High-Quality,
Objective Analysis
The purpose of regulatory impact analysis is to provide decision
makers with objective and reliable information about the consequences
of alternative courses of action. For this reason, analysts should be or-
ganized and managed in a fashion that best protects their ability to pro-
duce high-quality, objective analysis.
1. Functional Organization of Economists
Organization theory and the actual experience of federal agencies
both suggest that placement of economists in a separate office or bureau
managed by economists is the structure that best protects economists’
independence.112 This structure is sometimes referred to as “functional”
organization, because the agency’s professionals are organized on the ba-
sis of their functions. This organizational structure facilitates better qual-
ity control of the economists’ work, makes identifying and rewarding
economic expertise easier, encourages development of a common frame-
work for analysis, encourages economists to share and develop ideas
on new analytical methods, and facilitates recruitment of better
economists.113
A recent study that interviewed 16 senior economists and 16 senior
environmental assessors at federal agencies found a strong consensus
among the analysts that they have greater independence and greater abil-
ity to disagree with decisions of the agency’s program office when they
are not under the supervision of the staff that makes the decisions they
are analyzing.114 One economist noted, “It’s very difficult to conduct a
[benefit-cost analysis] if your boss wrote what you are analyzing.”115
Another economist suggested that the situation would be even better if
the economists who analyze regulations were placed in another federal
agency.116 When the SEC’s Chairwoman sought to improve the quality
and use of economic analysis in 2012, the chief economist became head
of the division that housed most of the Commission’s economists and
started reporting directly to the Chair.117
112 “Another way to promote objective analysis is to separate agency economists from the
program offices that propose regulations.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVE-
NESS, supra note 10, at 45.
113 Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists 10–11, 13–14 (Van-
derbilt L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155237.
114 Stuart Shapiro, Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureau-
cratic Organization and Analytical Requirements, 34(5) REV. POL’Y RES. 682 (2017).
115 Id. at 691.
116 Id.
117 Peirce, supra note 59, at 585.
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The experience of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is instruc-
tive. Most FTC economists are in a separate Bureau of Economics,
which has helped the economists remain an independent voice as admin-
istrations have changed.118 A 2015 evaluation by the FTC’s Office of
Inspector General noted, “Virtually all stakeholders interviewed recog-
nized the importance of the [Bureau of Economics’] purpose in providing
unbiased and sound economic analysis to support decision-making—a
function that is facilitated by its existence as a separate organization.”119
The influence of economics at the FTC is widely acknowledged to
be both pervasive and difficult to measure.120 In contrast to many regula-
tory agencies, a great deal of the FTC’s workload—and hence a great
deal of its economic analysis—focuses on enforcement cases under the
antitrust and consumer protection laws rather than actually writing regu-
lations. An empirical study found that Bureau of Economics’ recommen-
dations have a statistically significant effect on FTC decisions in merger
cases, but not as large an effect as the Bureau of Competition’s recom-
mendations.121 Jonathan Baker, who served as director of the FTC’s Bu-
reau of Economics during the Clinton administration, argues that
institutionalizing the Bureau’s role in Commission decisions has created
“continuous regulatory reform” in the form of routine application of ben-
efit-cost analysis in decision-making.122 He contends that the FTC’s Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection often reconsiders or revises its proposals if
it appears they will fail a benefit-cost test.123
The FTC’s “unfairness” standard illustrates the influence of eco-
nomic thinking at the Commission. The FTC Act prohibits “unfair” acts
and business practices.124 The Commission commenced numerous con-
sumer protection rulemakings in the 1970s, when the Commission’s au-
thority to issue rules became clear, but these rulemakings were often
based on vague and wide-ranging definitions of what counted as unfair
or deceptive.125 In 1978, the Bureau of Economics established the Con-
sumer Protection Division, and economists became significantly in-
118 Paul A. Pautler, A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics 117 (American Antitrust
Institute Working Paper No. 15-03, 2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2657330.
119 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EVALUATION OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S BUREAU OF ECONOMICS 9 (2015).
120 Pautler, supra note 118, at 115–17.
121 Malcolm B. Coate, Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission in Three
Presidential Administrations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 323, 340–46 (2000).
122 Jonathan B. Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 868–69 (1997).
123 Id. at 871.
124 Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness.
125 J. Howard Beales III, Brightening the Lines: The Use of Policy Statements at the
Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1057, 1061 (2005).
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volved in consumer protection rulemakings for the first time.126
“Economists brought a different set of questions to their analysis. The
core questions an economist asks revolves around the costs and benefits
of regulatory proposals, whether they are pursued through rules or indi-
vidual cases.”127 After a series of highly controversial rulemakings cre-
ated significant public backlash,128 the Commission, in December 1980,
adopted a policy statement to guide future unfairness enforcement ac-
tions.129 To be considered unfair, an action or practice must create sub-
stantial injury to consumers, must not be outweighed by any benefits to
consumers, and must be an injury that consumers could not reasonably
have avoided.130 Political furor over some of the FTC’s regulatory initia-
tives created a strong incentive for the Commission to limit its own dis-
cretion in some way, but economic logic provided the solution.
The FTC’s history also suggests that putting most of the agency’s
economists under the legal divisions reduces the economists’ indepen-
dence. Fritz Mueller, who became the FTC’s chief economist in 1963,
faced the task of rebuilding the bureau after most of its economists had
been moved into the legal divisions in the 1950s.131 He observed the
following:
I think the reason the economists were moved out of the
Bureau of Economics into the legal division was an out-
growth of the controversy between economists and attor-
neys . . . . The economists . . . disagreed vehemently
with the economic approach being taken by the legal di-
vision, and the lawyers wanted greater control over the
economists. I think it’s a terrible idea myself.132
The FTC moved its economists back into the Bureau of Economics
under Mueller, where most FTC economists have served to this day.133
Former FCC chief economist Thomas Hazlett succinctly summa-
rized the structure and role of an economic analysis office in an indepen-
dent agency:
126 Id. at 1062.
127 Id. at 1062–63.
128 Id. at 1064–65.
129 Id.
130 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 124.
131 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, ROUNDTABLE WITH FORMER
DIRECTORS OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS 28 (2003).
132 Id.
133 Economists occasionally fill other management roles outside the Bureau of Econom-
ics. For example, J. Howard Beales served as director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection
from 2001 to 2004. The author served as deputy director of the Commission’s Office of Policy
Planning from 2001 to 2003.
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The basic requirements for creating an Office of Eco-
nomic Analysis at the FCC [are] that a critical mass of
economic expertise be assembled in one location; that
the office be directed by an economist of high rank and
authority within the agency; that the office be given lati-
tude to select research teams, relevant study projects,
and to thereby acquire deep knowledge of relevant mar-
kets and policies; that the staff professionals be active in
scholarly research; and that this sophisticated analytical
base [ ] productively participates in FCC policy-
making.134
2. Basis for Performance Evaluation
A separate but related issue is the criteria for evaluation of econo-
mists’ performance for purposes of pay and promotion.
Unfortunately, regulatory agencies often act as if their job is to pro-
duce regulations rather than to produce outcomes.135 As one agency
economist noted, “Success is putting out 10 regulations a year and bigger
regulations are bigger successes. They don’t say, ‘we examined 10 [situ-
ations] and we decided that 8 did not warrant regulation . . . .’”136 Pay,
bonuses, career advancement, plaques, and other forms of recognition go
to staff members who successfully complete regulatory proceedings.137
The purpose of regulatory impact analysis is to provide high-qual-
ity, objective information to inform decisions. Therefore, the perform-
ance of individual analysts should be evaluated in part on the basis of
whether they produce high-quality and relevant analysis.138 Economics
bureaus in government agencies also often perform an R&D function,
developing new data, new methods, and original empirical findings to
address critical policy questions.139 Analysts should also be rewarded on
the basis of the quality and usefulness of such work.
134 Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission:
A Simple Proposal to Atone for Past Sins 19 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 11-
23, 2011).
135 Jerry Ellig & Richard Williams, Reforming Regulatory Analysis, Review, and Over-
sight: A Guide for the PerplexedAug. 13, 2014), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Mer-
catus Center at George Mason University), available at https://www.mercatus.org/publication/
reforming-regulatory-analysis-review-and-oversight-guide-perplexed.
136 Williams, supra note 38, at 7. R
137 Id.
138 “The work of agency economists should be evaluated by other economists, with com-
pensation and career advancement tied to the quality of their analysis, not on whether the
analysis supports decisions already made.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVE-
NESS, supra note 10, at 45.
139 Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission:
A Simple Proposal to Atone for Past Sins 19 (2011), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Work
Images/Download/RFF-DP-11-23.pdf.
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B. Establish Agency-Wide Standards for Regulatory Impact Analysis
OMB Circular A-4 provides a great deal of useful guidance on how
to conduct regulatory impact analysis.140 An agency can demonstrate its
commitment to conducting high-quality analysis by issuing its own stan-
dards that incorporate the concepts in Circular A-4 and explain how to
apply them to the particular types of regulations written by the agency.
Agency-specific standards explicitly commit the agency to regulatory
impact analysis as a matter of policy and help communicate how to carry
out the analysis in practice.
1. Basic Elements
At a bare minimum, an agency’s standards for regulatory impact
analysis should identify the four major items any good regulatory impact
analysis should cover: analysis of the problem, alternatives, and estima-
tion of the benefits and the costs of each alternative.141 The SEC’s gui-
dance is one example of a document that addresses these items, and it
explicitly refers to OMB’s much more detailed guidance in Circular A-
4.142
2. Agency-Specific Factors
Other agencies have gone much further than the basic elements,
authoring guidance that helps explain how to conduct various aspects of
the analysis for the specific types of regulations written by the agency.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s guidance includes examples rele-
vant to nuclear power plant safety, lists specific categories of benefits
and costs that should be included, and contains a special section on regu-
latory analysis of “backfits” applicable to existing nuclear power
plants.143 The US Department of Transportation maintains a list of
“rulemaking requirements” that refer the reader to relevant executive or-
ders and OMB guidance documents on regulatory analysis.144 The de-
partment also periodically revises and posts on its website the default
140 U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 25. R
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULA-
TION, REGULATORY ANALYSIS GUIDELINES OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:
DRAFT REPORT FOR COMMENT (2017), available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1710/ML
17100A480.pdf.
144 Neil Eisner, U.S. Department of Transportation Rulemaking Requirements 23–24
(March 2012), available at https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/rulemaking-require
ments-2012.
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values for consumers’ travel time and the value of a statistical life to be
used in regulatory impact analysis.145
3. The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis and Cost-effectiveness
Analysis
The purpose of benefit-cost analysis is to determine whether a gov-
ernment action can improve economic efficiency and to compare the ef-
fects of alternative government actions on economic efficiency.146
Regulation can improve economic efficiency if it remedies a “market
failure.”147 Commonly discussed forms of market failure include exter-
nalities, monopoly, public goods, and asymmetric information.148 A mar-
ket failure occurs when the private marginal benefits or costs faced by
decision makers deviate from the social marginal benefits or costs.149
This deviation of private and social benefits or costs means that private
decisions will not produce the economically efficient result.150 Govern-
ments can also fail to produce the economically efficient result, because
the private benefits and costs faced by government decision makers may
deviate from social benefits and costs.151 In cases of both market and
government failure, benefit-cost analysis is necessary to determine
whether a change in policy will improve economic efficiency.152 A bene-
fit-cost analysis of alternatives can identify the alternative with the great-
est “net benefits” (benefits minus costs).153
Not all statutory mandates or regulations are intended to improve
economic efficiency by remedying market or government failures. Many
regulatory policies are intended primarily to ensure fairness in some way
that involves redistribution of wealth or income.154 Others seek to reduce
145 See Economic Values Used in Analyses, US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (De-
cember 21, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-
analysis.
146 RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR., & DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 10 (1994).
147 Id.
148 For a highly readable and brief description of market failures, see SUSAN E. DUDLEY
& JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 12–20 (2012).
149 ZERBE supra note 146 at 14.
150 Id.
151 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976).
152 ZERBE supra note 146 at 13.
153 ZERBE supra note 146 at 3.
154 Regulation of rates that freight railroads can charge shippers who lack other transpor-
tation options for goods, for example, primarily affects the division of profits between the
railroad and the shipper; it reflects a congressional preference that a shipper who lacks other
transportation options should not pay dramatically different rates than a similar shipper who
has other transportation options. Similarly, the FCC’s universal service programs that subsi-
dize broadband and phones for low-income and rural residents do not have much of an eco-
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A      11/30/2018   10:47:34
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A      11/30/2018   10:47:34
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\28-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-NOV-18 13:30
2018] CONDUCT REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 27
risks to some level that policymakers have decided is desirable, even if
that level is below the economically efficient level.
In such cases, a cost-effectiveness analysis can inform decision
makers about the lowest-cost way to achieve a desired policy out-
come.155 For example, “universal service” programs that subsidize tele-
phone service for low-income and rural subscribers are intended to
reduce the number of households that lack telephones.156 A cost-effec-
tiveness analysis conducted to inform the reform of universal service
programs by the Public Utility Commission of Texas found that the low-
income subsidies increased subscribership at an average social cost of
$663 per new subscriber annually, subsidies in rural areas served by
large phone companies cost an average of $13,622 per new subscriber,
and subsidies in rural areas served by small phone companies cost an
average of $11,184 per new subscriber.157
4. Distributional Analysis
A conventional benefit-cost analysis identifies the net benefits of
each alternative. The people who bear the costs, however, may not al-
ways be the same people who receive the benefits. When these groups
are significantly different, a separate distributional analysis that identifies
disparate impacts may be helpful to decision makers. Distributional anal-
ysis should identify who bears costs, who receives benefits, and who has
net gains and net losses from the regulation. This seemingly simple type
of distributional analysis is rare even in regulatory impact analyses from
executive branch agencies.158
In recent years, the effect of regulations on employment has become
a contentious issue. The question of who gains or loses jobs as the result
of an individual regulation is primarily a distributional issue.159 If em-
ployment effects are included in the regulatory impact analysis of an in-
dividual regulation, they should be addressed in the distributional
analysis.
nomic efficiency rationale; they reflect a congressional desire that all citizens have affordable
access to a minimal level of communications services.
155 Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J.
1067, 1069 (2003) (finding that transfer regulations are not suitable to cost-benefit analysis
and arguing for cost-effectiveness analysis).
156 Jerry Ellig & Joseph Rotondi, Outcomes and Alternatives for Universal Telecommuni-
cations Service: A Case Study of Texas, 12 TX REV. L. & POL. 1, 45 (2007).
157 Id.
158 See Lisa A. Robinson et al., Attention to Distribution in U.S. Regulatory Analyses, 10
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 308 (2016).
159 DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel & Christopher Car-
rigan eds., 2015).
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5. Standards of Evidence
An honest, objective analysis should meet the standard of evidence
articulated in Executive Order 12866: “Each agency shall base its deci-
sions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic,
and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, the
intended regulation.”160 This means that analysts should not selectively
choose data or studies to support predetermined conclusions. When dif-
ferent studies or data lead to different conclusions, the analyst should use
them to identify the range of possible outcomes, identify the most likely
outcome, and support this determination with evidence.
6. Full Disclosure
The agency’s guidance should commit it to full disclosure of all
reports, analysis, and data it relied upon when developing the regulation.
As recommended by the American Bar Association, this practice would
give affected parties a fuller opportunity to evaluate and comment on the
factual basis for the regulation.161
C. Conduct Analysis Before Making Decisions
A regulatory impact analysis should inform decisions, not simply
justify decisions that have already been made for other reasons. Four
steps can help mitigate the tendency for “ready-fire-aim” rulemaking.
First, involve economists on cross-functional teams early in the pro-
cess, when program staff members are initially considering whether a
new regulation is necessary and developing options.162 Cross-functional
teams help mitigate a potential disadvantage of the functional organiza-
tion recommended earlier. Placed in a separate organization, the econo-
mists could miss opportunities to influence decisions at an early stage; by
the time they are included, a decision may have already been made.163
Several examples suggest that cross-functional teams help solve this po-
tential problem. The cross-functional teams approach has been credited
with some of the recent improvement in the SEC’s economic analysis.164
160 Exec. Order No. 12866, §1(b)(7), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (Oct. 4, 1993).
161 Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L.
REV. 629 (2017).
162 Froeb et al., supra note 113, at 11–13.
163 Id.; Shapiro, supra note 114, at 692.
164 A former SEC attorney notes that the SEC staff’s 2012 economic analysis guidance
had precisely this effect at that agency: “The 2012 Guidance has in effect amended the micro-
constitution of the SEC staff, elevating the economists to the status of a co-equal branch of the
agency.” See Bruce R. Kraus, Economists in the Room at the SEC, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 280,
302 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/economists-in-the-room-at-the-sec. For evi-
dence of improvement in the SEC’s economic analysis after issuance of the 2012 Guidance,
see Ellig, supra note 19. R
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Similarly, some agencies that house environmental assessors in a sepa-
rate unit from the program office involve the assessors from the outset by
including them on cross-functional teams.165 The FTC has employed this
approach for decades, both for regulations and for enforcement deci-
sions.166 Over time, attorneys have become adept at using the economic
framework to assess both antitrust and consumer protection issues.167
Within an economics bureau, economists can be organized into subunits
that match the agency’s different regulation-writing divisions, so that in-
dividual analysts and their managers can more easily coordinate their
workflow with the regulation writers and the enforcement units.
Second, create an incentive for program staff to consider the econo-
mists’ advice by allowing the economics office to make its own, inde-
pendent recommendations to the decision makers.168 Functional
organization of economists should give them greater freedom to offer
objective advice and provide greater odds that their advice will reach the
ears of higher-level decision makers in the organization.169 In addition to
giving economists greater independence to reach their own conclusions,
the FTC also gives the Bureau of Economics independent opportunities
to make recommendations to the commission.170 On the majority of mat-
ters before the FTC, the Bureau can offer its views both in writing and
orally at Commission meetings.171 Economic and legal staffs write sepa-
rate memoranda to the Commission both when the Commission is decid-
ing whether to open an investigation and when the matter is ready for
final decision.172 This approach gives the economists’ views greater
clout in two ways. First, it ensures that the Commissioners can directly
hear advice which incorporates an economic perspective.173 Second, it
creates an incentive for the attorneys working on a case or other matter to
take the economists’ advice seriously and reach consensus with the econ-
omists before the matter goes to the Commission.174 The inspector gen-
eral’s report states that less than 10 percent of the Bureau of Economics’
165 See Shapiro, supra note 114, at 691.
166 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 131, at 89–90, 151–52. See also Froeb et al.,
supra note 113, at 12–13; Baker, supra note 122, at 869 (“Together, the legal and economic
staff review documents, interview witnesses, develop theories explaining how the conduct
under review might be beneficial or harmful to the public, and identify possible remedies.”).
167 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 131, at 100–01, 142–43.
168 Froeb et al., supra note 113, at 16–17.
169 Shapiro, supra note 163, at 691–92. R
170 Pautler, supra note 118, at 113. R
171 Id. at 114.
172 Jonathan B. Baker, supra note 122, at 869. R
173 Pautler, supra note 118, at 111. R
174 Id. at 113.
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recommendations to the Commission disagree with those from the other
bureaus.175
Third, consult with stakeholders about the need for a regulation and
alternative approaches before writing a regulation. A recent study found
that agencies tend to produce more thorough analyses when they consult
with stakeholders such as state, local, or tribal governments.176
Fourth, publish a preliminary analysis of the problem the agency
seeks to solve and the benefits and costs of alternatives before publishing
a regulation.177 There is evidence that agencies produce more thorough
analyses when they first seek public comment on a prior proposal, pub-
lish a preliminary analysis, or ask the public for data before they propose
a new regulation.178
D. Explain How the Analysis Affected Decisions
Some commentators present regulatory impact analysis or benefit-
cost analysis as a decision-making procedure that substitutes the econo-
mist’s calculations for the decision maker’s judgment.179 The decision
maker need merely choose the alternative that produces the greatest dif-
ference between benefits and costs—the maximum net benefit.180
This approach presumes that the decision maker’s goal is maximiza-
tion of economic welfare. For regulations that are intended solely to rem-
edy market failures, this is the appropriate goal. If the decision maker is
reasonably certain that all significant benefits and costs have been mea-
sured and converted to monetary values accurately, the analyst’s calcula-
tions can greatly simplify decision-making.
175 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 119, at 9. R
176 Jerry Ellig and Rosemarie Fike, Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the
Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis, 7 J. BEN.-COST ANALYSIS 523, 537 (2016).
177 In 2009, coauthors of a Resources for the Future monograph recommended that “a
preliminary RIA [regulatory impact analysis] be prepared at least six months in advance of
final agency review of proposed and final regulations. Understandably, a preliminary RIA may
be incomplete and subject to greater uncertainties than the full study. At the same time, this
preliminary RIA would characterize the full set of options being analyzed and would provide
at least rough estimates of the benefits and costs of each option.” Winston Harrington et al.
eds., What We Learned, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 225. R
Similarly, Carrigan and Shapiro propose that agencies should be incentivized to produce sim-
pler preliminary analyses that examine a wide scope of alternatives before they propose regu-
lations. See Christopher Carrigan & Stuart Shapiro, What’s Wrong with the Back of the
Envelope: A Call for Simple (and Timely) Benefit-Cost Analysis, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 203
(2016). In 2011, President Obama’s Jobs Council recommended expanding the use of advance
notices of proposed rulemaking without making it a requirement. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
ON JOBS & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 10, at 43.
178 Ellig & Fike, supra note 176, at 537. R
179 See Graham, supra note 21, at 432. R
180 See id. Former OIRA Administrator John Graham referring to this as the “hard” bene-
fit-cost test.
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However, some regulations address distributional concerns, un-
monetized values, or statutory considerations that are neither benefits nor
costs. For these types of regulations, decision makers surely should be
aware of the benefit and cost consequences, but benefits and costs may
not be the only factors driving the decisions. This is the “soft” benefit-
cost test implied by the language in Executive Order 12866 specifying
that agencies should regulate only when the benefits “justify” the
costs.181 It is precisely what many federal regulatory economists recom-
mend when surveyed.182
For this reason, the agency should explain any aspect of the analysis
that affected its regulatory decisions—not just present a calculation of
net benefits of alternatives. Perhaps the agency did not choose the alter-
native that maximized net benefits, but the assessment of the problem
helped identify the most effective or cost-effective alternative. If unquan-
tified benefits and costs, or values that are neither benefits nor costs,
affected regulatory decisions, the agency should explain these factors and
present evidence that they are significant to citizens.183
E. Invite Review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Independent agencies’ regulations and analyses are not currently
subject to OIRA review.184 An independent agency could take a more
controversial, but potentially productive, step by inviting OIRA to re-
view its regulations and accompanying regulatory analysis.
Evidence shows that the requirements in the executive orders, cou-
pled with review by OIRA, have induced agencies to engage in more
thorough analysis than they would undertake otherwise. For example,
“prescriptive” regulations that contain mandates or prohibitions receive
more intensive OIRA review than regulations that implement budget pro-
grams; prescriptive regulations also tend to have more thorough regula-
tory impact analysis.185 Agencies produce higher-quality analysis when
181 Id.
182 Williams, supra note 38, at 6 (“No economist I interviewed thought that the results of R
a well-done economic analysis, specifically identifying the option that maximizes net benefits,
should dictate decisions to a decision maker. But none thought decision makers should be free
to ignore the results of benefit-cost analysis, particularly when, for some aspects of regulatory
decisions, there were large costs and very small benefits.”). See also Al McGartland, Thirty
Years of Economics at the Environmental Protection Agency, 42 AG. & RES. ECON. REV. 436,
450 (2013) (“Some stakeholders believe that benefit-cost analysis dictates what to do. Not
so.”).
183 Ellig & Williams, supra note 135, at 28–30.
184 Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
185 See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of
Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 179 (2011).
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OIRA reviews the regulation for a longer time.186 Agencies also produce
higher-quality analysis when the OIRA review is concluded under a pre-
sidentially appointed OIRA administrator rather than an acting adminis-
trator; OIRA has more clout in the administration when the administrator
is a presidential appointee.187
The concept of submitting independent agencies’ regulations and
analyses to OIRA is controversial because it appears to limit their inde-
pendence from the executive branch.188 Some argue that the primary rea-
son for creating independent agencies in the first place is to insulate them
from political pressure and capture by special interests.189 If one believes
that this type of capture is more likely when the agency is responsible to
the president, then the argument against having OIRA review indepen-
dent agencies’ regulations is straightforward.190 Another traditional argu-
ment for independent agencies, however, is that they are more likely to
make decisions based on facts and expertise.191 OIRA review can facili-
tate this goal by coordinating input from other expert agencies and pro-
viding a fresh perspective on the agency’s economic analysis.192
A voluntary arrangement for OIRA review could take one of several
forms. OIRA could simply offer comments privately on the agency’s
proposed regulations and analysis, which could be considered technical
assistance rather than formal OIRA review or oversight.193 Alternatively,
the agency and OIRA could agree that OIRA could publicize any con-
cerns about the regulation or the analysis; if the agency disagrees with
OIRA, it would have to go on record acting contrary to OIRA’s advice.
Finally, the agency could agree that it will not move forward with a regu-
lation unless it addresses OIRA’s significant concerns with the regulation
or the analysis. This approach effectively means that the agency has al-
lowed OIRA to return regulations to the agency for further work, just as
OIRA does with executive branch agencies.
186 See Ellig & Fike, supra note 176, at 540; Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, Does
Haste Make Waste? How Long Does It Take to Do a Good Regulatory Impact Analysis?, 48
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 367 (2016).
187 Ellig & Fike, supra note 176, at 540.
188 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional De-
sign, 89 TX L. REV. 15, 16 (2010).
189 Id. at 16.
190 Id. at 34–36.
191 Id. at 19–21.
192 Id. at 33–34. Barkow also notes that OIRA may lack some of the specialized expertise
of the agency proposing the regulation. Id. at 34.
193 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2012), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/oira_cftc_mou_
2012.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
This article outlines the role regulatory impact analysis can play at
independent regulatory agencies, documents deficiencies in current prac-
tice, and suggests five steps that an agency can take to produce and use
high-quality, objective regulatory impact analysis. Any agency so in-
clined faces one additional challenge: how to credibly commit to this
change for the long term. Fortunately, credible commitment mechanisms
are available.
One commitment mechanism is bureaucratic inertia. The organiza-
tional, incentive, and cultural changes outlined in Part IV will require
significant initial effort to accomplish. For this reason, they will also be
difficult to reverse once established.
An agency seeking a stronger commitment mechanism can institu-
tionalize many of the policies and procedures described in Part IV by
formally adopting them in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). For
example, when the US Department of Energy considers whether to issue
energy efficiency or water efficiency standards for appliances, it follows
procedures that are extensively documented in an appendix to the rele-
vant section of the CFR.194 The department commits to issuing an ad-
vance notice of proposed rulemaking that identifies potential standards
and discloses all analytical work produced to date, in order to gather
stakeholder input before it completes the analysis and selects a standard
to propose as a regulation.195 The appendix outlines the major factors to
be considered by the department’s analysis, such as the engineering anal-
ysis; effects on manufacturers and consumers; and the effectiveness of
nonregulatory alternatives.196 It explains how the analysis of these fac-
tors will be conducted and establishes timetables for stakeholder feed-
back.197 The appendix also explains how the department will use the
results of the analysis to make decisions.198
The Department of Energy states that these commitments do not
create new grounds for judicial review of its regulations, but commits to
(1) providing notice and explanation of any deviations in specific in-
stances, and (2) publishing a notice in the Federal Register if it perma-
nently alters any of the policies or procedures.199 An independent agency
that wanted to offer an even more credible commitment could specify
that noncompliance with its policies and procedures published in the
CFR could be grounds for judicial review.
194 Energy and Water Conservation Standards, 10 C.F.R. pt. 430C, app’x A.
195 Id. § 4(c).
196 Id. §§ 9–12.
197 Id. §§ 4, 9–12.
198 Id. § 5.
199 Id. § 14.
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From railroads to broadband and from toy magnets to financial de-
rivatives, regulation by independent agencies is now a pervasive feature
of the US economy. Yet many independent agencies are not required to
systematically assess the economic effects of regulations before making
regulatory decisions. This article demonstrates why regulatory impact
analysis is necessary and explains how independent agencies can build
the capacity to conduct objective analysis to inform decisions.
